This agreement was signed between Egypt and Great Britain, which at the time represented Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika (now Tanzania) and Sudan. The document gave Cairo the right to veto projects further upstream of the Nile that would affect its share of the water. Egypt wants an alternative to the agreement, which now allows other Nile Basin countries to carry out projects along the river without its prior consent. Part V describes the dispute resolution procedures that may arise from the implementation and enforcement of the contract. It also provides for the creation of bilateral or plurilateral instruments (agreements) that would complement the CFA. This agreement between Egypt and Sudan, which complemented the previous agreement, gave Egypt the right to 55.5 billion cubic meters of Nile water per year and Sudan to 18.5 billion cubic meters per year. In 1999, the Nile Riparian States [1], with the exception of Eritrea, signed the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) to improve cooperation in the use of “common water resources of the Nile Basin”. Under the auspices of the NBI, riparian States began to develop what they saw as a permanent legal and institutional framework for the management of the Nile Basin. The Framework Cooperation Agreement (GFA), as it is known, formally introduced the concept of equitable water allocation into discussions on Nile governance, as well as a complex concept called “water security”. These disagreements over the use of the Nile are not new and have a long history due to the high dependence of these countries on the waters of the Nile. In 1929, an agreement was reached between Egypt and Britain on the use of water from the Nile – Britain is said to have represented its colonies in the Nile Basin. [1] The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty dealt with many issues related to the Nile and its tributaries. It is particularly important for this discussion that he has granted Egypt an annual allocation of water of 48 billion cubic meters and Sudan 4 billion cubic meters with an estimated average annual yield of 84 billion cubic meters.

In addition, the 1929 agreement granted Egypt a veto over construction projects on the Nile or one of its tributaries in order to minimize any impact on the flow of water into the Nile. The heads of state and government of Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan signed a cooperation agreement on the Great Renaissance Dam in 2015 to ease tensions. The agreement should pave the way for further diplomatic cooperation. Key principles of the agreement include prioritizing downstream countries for the electricity produced by the dam, a dispute resolution mechanism and compensation for damages. On Monday, March 23, 2015, the Heads of State and Government of Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan met in the Sudanese capital Khartoum to sign an agreement to resolve various issues arising from Ethiopia`s decision to build a dam on the Blue Nile. The Khartoum Declaration, signed by the heads of state of the three countries – Abdel Fattah al-Sisi (Egypt), Omar al-Bashir (Sudan) and Halemariam Desalegn (Ethiopia) – has been described as the “Nile Agreement”, which contributes to the resolution of conflicts over the sharing of the waters of the Nile. However, this view is misleading because, as far as we know, the agreement only deals with the Blue Nile Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERDP) project and does not address the broader and still controversial issues of the division of Nile water among all riparian states. Thus, the new agreement leaves the conflict over the fair, just and reasonable allocation and use of the Nile unresolved. [2] The countries bordering the Nile are Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan (Republic), Tanzania and Uganda. Egypt, Sudan and South Sudan are downstream riparian states. However, South Sudan has indicated that it does not recognize the 1959 bilateral agreement between Egypt and Sudan.

The CFA was ready to be signed on May 10, 2010; Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda have signed it; and the Ethiopian Parliament has ratified it. However, Egypt and Sudan argued that their “acquired rights” over the waters of the Nile would not be protected and immediately expressed their intention not to sign the agreement because they objected to the wording of Article 14(b): “The Nile Basin States therefore agree in a spirit of cooperation: […] (b) not significantly affect the water security of another State in the Nile Basin. They then proposed another formulation for Article 14(b): “The Nile Basin States therefore agree in a spirit of cooperation: […] (b) not to significantly affect water security and the current uses and rights of another Nile Basin State” (emphasis added). This formulation has been rejected by upstream riparian states, who argue that the phrase “current uses and rights” would anchor the concept of older rights, including those created by the Nile Water Accords, and effectively maintain the injustice and injustice that has characterized the allocation and use of water in the Nile Basin since the 1920s. The signing of the agreement had already been scheduled at a ministerial meeting in 2007, but had been postponed at Egypt`s request. [21] At a new ministerial meeting in Kinshasa in May 2009, the upstream countries decided to sign the agreement without all countries signing at the same time. However, the signing was delayed and at the next meeting of ministers in Sharm el-Sheikh in April 2010, Egypt again requested to postpone the signing. In particular, the article on water security (Article 14 ter) raised objections from Egypt and the Sudan. .